Time-varying monetary-policy rules and financial stress: Does financial instability matter for monetary policy?

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\section*{Abstract}
We examine whether and how selected central banks responded to episodes of financial stress over the last three decades. We employ a recently developed monetary-policy rule estimation methodology which allows for time-varying response coefficients and corrects for endogeneity. This flexible framework applied to the USA, the UK, Australia, Canada, and Sweden, together with a new financial stress dataset developed by the International Monetary Fund, not only allows testing of whether central banks responded to financial stress, but also detects the periods and types of stress that were the most worrying for monetary authorities and quantifies the intensity of the policy response. Our findings suggest that central banks often change policy rates, mainly decreasing them in the face of high financial stress. However, the size of the policy response varies substantially over time as well as across countries, with the 2008–2009 financial crisis being the period of the most severe and generalized response. With regard to the specific components of financial stress, most central banks seemed to respond to stock-market stress and bank stress, while exchange-rate stress is found to drive the reaction of central banks only in more open economies.

\section*{1. Introduction}

The recent financial crisis has intensified the interest in exploring the interactions between monetary policy and financial stability. Official interest rates were driven sharply to historical lows, and many unconventional measures were used to pump liquidity into the international financial system. Central banks pursued monetary policy under high economic uncertainty coupled with large financial shocks in many countries. The financial crisis also raised new challenges for central bank policies, in particular the operationalization of issues related to financial stability for monetary-policy decision making (Goodhart, 2006; Borio and Drehmann, 2009).

This paper seeks to analyze whether and how monetary policy interest rates evolved in response to financial instability over the last three decades. The monetary policies of central banks are likely to react to financial instability in a non-linear way (Goodhart et al., 2009). When a financial system is stable, the interest-rate-setting process largely reflects macroeconomic conditions, and financial stability considerations enter monetary policy discussions only to a limited degree. On the other hand, central banks may alter their monetary policies to reduce financial imbalances if these become severe. In this respect, Mishkin (2009) questions the traditional linear-quadratic framework when financial markets are disrupted and puts forward an argument for replacing it with non-linear dynamics describing the economy and a non-quadratic objective function resulting in non-linear optimal policy.

To address the complexity of the nexus between monetary policy and financial stability as well as to evaluate monetary policy in a systematic manner, this paper employs the recently developed time-varying parameter estimation of monetary-policy rules, appropriately accounting for endogeneity in policy rules. This flexible framework, together with a new comprehensive financial stress dataset developed by the International Monetary Fund, will allow not only testing of whether central banks responded to financial stress, but also quantification of the magnitude of this response.

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\textsuperscript{1} That is, linear behavior of the economy and a quadratic objective function of the monetary authority.
and detection of the periods and types of stress that were the most worrying for monetary authorities.

Although theoretical studies disagree about the role of financial instability for central banks’ interest-rate-setting policies, our empirical estimates of the time-varying monetary-policy rules of the US Fed, the Bank of England (BoE), the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA), the Bank of Canada (BoC), and Sveriges Riksbank (SR) show that central banks often alter the course of monetary policy in the face of high financial stress, mainly by decreasing policy rates.\(^2\)

However, the size of this response varies substantially over time as well as across countries. There is some cross-country and time heterogeneity as well when we examine central banks’ considerations of specific types of financial stress: most of them seemed to respond to stock-market stress and bank stress, and exchange-rate stress drives central bank reactions only in more open economies.

The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses related literature. Section 3 describes our data and empirical methodology. Section 4 presents our results. Section 5 concludes. An appendix with a detailed description of the methodology and additional results follows.

2. Related literature

First, this section gives a brief overview of the theory as well as empirical evidence on the relationship between monetary policy (rules) and financial instability. Second, it provides a short summary of various measures of financial stress.

2.1. Monetary policy (rules) and financial instability – some theories

Financial friction, such as unequal access to credit or debt collateralization, is recognized as having important consequences for monetary policy transmission, and Fisher (1933) has already presented the idea that adverse credit-market conditions can cause significant macroeconomic disequilibria.

During the last two decades, the effects of monetary policy have been studied mainly within New Keynesian (NK) dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models, which assume the existence of nominal rigidities. The common approach to incorporating financial market friction within the DSGE framework is to introduce the financial accelerator mechanism (Bernanke et al., 1996, 1999), implying that endogenous developments in credit markets work to amplify and propagate shocks to the macro economy. Tovar (2009) emphasizes that the major weakness of the financial accelerator mechanism is that it only addresses one of many possible financial frictions. Goodhart et al. (2009) note that many NK DSGE models lack the financial sector completely or model it in a rather embryonic way. Consequently, more recent contributions within this stream of literature have examined other aspects of financial friction, such as balance sheets in the banking sector (Choi and Cook, 2004), the portfolio-choice issue with complete (Engel and Matsumoto, 2009) or incomplete markets (Devereux and Sutherland, 2007), and collateral constraints (Iacovello and Neri, 2010).\(^3\)

A few studies focus more specifically on the relationship between the monetary-policy stance (or the monetary-policy rule) and financial stability. However, they do not arrive at a unanimous view of whether a monetary-policy rule should include some measure of financial stability. Brousseau and Detken (2001) present an NK model where a conflict arises between short-term price stability and financial stability due to a self-fulfilling belief linking the stability of inflation to the smoothness of the interest-rate path and suggests that monetary policy should react to financial instability. Akram et al. (2007) investigate the macroeconomic implications of pursuing financial stability within a flexible inflation-targeting framework. Their model, using a policy rule augmented by financial-stability indicators, shows that the gains of such an augmented rule vis-à-vis the rule without financial-stability indicators highly depend on the nature of the shocks. Akram and Eitrheim (2008) build on the previous framework, finding some evidence that the policy response to housing prices, equity prices or credit growth can cause high interest-rate volatility and actually lower financial stability in terms of indicators that are sensitive to interest rates. Cecchetti and Li (2008) show, in both a static and dynamic setting, that a potential conflict between monetary policy and financial supervision can be avoided if the interest-rate rule takes into account (procyclical) capital-adequacy requirements, in particular, that policy interest rates are lowered when financial stress is high. Bauducco et al. (2008) extend the current benchmark NK model to include financial systems and firms that require external financing. Their simulations show that if a central bank responds to financial instability by policy easing, it achieves better inflation and output stabilization in the short term at the cost of greater inflation and output volatility in the long term, and vice versa. For the US Fed, Taylor (2008) proposes a modification of the standard Taylor rule to incorporate adjustments to credit spreads. Teranishi (2008) derives a Taylor rule augmented by the response to credit spreads as an optimal policy under heterogeneous loan-interest-rate contracts. He finds that the policy response to a credit spread can be both positive and negative, depending on the financial structure. However, he also proposes that when nominal policy rates are close to zero, a commitment rather than a discretionary policy response is the key to reducing credit spreads. Christiano et al. (2008) suggest augmenting the Taylor rule with aggregate private credit and find that such a policy would raise welfare by reducing the magnitude of the output fluctuations. Cúrdia and Woodford (2010) develop a NK DSGE model with credit friction to evaluate the performance of alternative policy rules that are augmented by a response (1) to credit spreads and (2) to aggregate the volume of private credit in the face of different shocks. They argue that the response to credit spreads can be welfare improving, but the optimal size of such a response is probably rather small. Like Teranishi (2009), they find little support for augmenting the Taylor rule by the credit volume, given that the size and even the sign of the desired response is sensitive to the sources of shock and their persistence, which is information that is not always available during operational policy making.

A related stream of literature focuses on the somewhat narrower issue of whether or not monetary policy should respond to asset prices. Bernanke and Gertler (1999, 2001) argue that the stabilization of inflation and output provides a substantial contribution to financial stability and that there are few, if any, gains to responding to asset prices. Faia and Monacelli (2007) extend the model developed by Bernanke and Gertler (2001) by a robust welfare metric, confirming that strict inflation stabilization offers the best solution. Cecchetti et al. (2000) take the opposite stance, arguing that developments in asset markets can have a significant impact on both inflation and real economic activity, and central banks might achieve better outcomes by considering asset prices provided they are able to detect asset-price misalignments. Borio and Lowe (2002) support this view, claiming that financial imbalances can build up

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\(^2\) Our choice of countries is based on data availability and on the suitability of the data for our econometric framework. Due to limited data availability, we do not include the Reserve Bank of New Zealand, the ECB, and emerging countries. The Bank of Japan could not be included either, given that its policy rates were flat for an extended period.

\(^3\) A survey of this literature is provided by Tovar (2009).
even in a low-inflation environment, which is normally favorable to financial stability. The side effect of low inflation is that excess demand pressures may first appear in credit aggregates and asset prices rather than consumer prices, which are normally considered by policy makers. Gruen et al. (2005) argue that responding to an asset bubble is feasible only when the monetary authority is able to make a correct judgment about the process driving the bubble. Roubini (2006) and Posen (2006) provide a summary of this debate from a policy perspective.

2.2. Monetary policy (rules) and financial instability – empirical evidence

The empirical evidence on central banks’ reactions to financial instability is rather scant. Following the ongoing debate about whether central banks should respond to asset-price volatility (e.g. Bernanke and Gertler, 1999, 2001; Cecchetti et al., 2000), some studies have tested the response of monetary policy to different asset prices, most commonly stock prices (Rigobon and Sack, 2003; Chadha et al., 2004; Siklos and Bohl, 2008; Fuhrer and Toott, 2008). They find some evidence either that asset prices entered the policy-information set (because they contain information about future inflation) or that some central banks were directly trying to offset these disequilibrria. All of these papers estimate time-invariant policy rules, which means that they test a permanent response to these variables. However, it seems more plausible that if central banks respond to asset prices, they do so only when asset-price misalignments are substantial; in other words, their responses are asymmetric. There are two additional controversies related to the effects of asset prices on monetary-policy decisions. The first concerns the measure, in particular whether the stock-market index that is typically employed is sufficiently representative, or whether some other assets, in particular housing prices, should be considered as well. The second issue is related to the (even ex-post) identification of asset-price misalignment. Finally, it is likely that the perception of misalignments is influenced by general economic conditions and that a possible response might evolve over time.

Detken and Smets (2004) summarize some stylized facts on macroeconomic and monetary-policy developments during asset-price booms. Overall, they find that monetary policy was significantly looser during high-cost booms that were marked by crashes of investment and real-estate prices in the post-boom periods.

A few empirical studies measure the monetary-policy response using broader measures of financial imbalances. Borio and Lowe (2004) estimate the response of four central banks (the Reserve Bank of Australia, the Bundesbank, the Bank of Japan, and the US Fed) to imbalances proxied by the ratio of private-sector credit to GDP, inflation-adjusted equity prices, and their composite. They find either negative or ambiguous evidence for all countries except the USA, confirming that the Fed responded to financial imbalances in an asymmetric and reactive way, i.e., that the federal funds rate was disproportionately lowered in the face of imbalance unwinding, but was not tightened beyond normal as imbalances built up. Cecchetti and Li (2008) estimate a Taylor rule augmented by a measure of banking stress, in particular the deviation of leverage ratios (total loans to the sum of equity and subordinated debt; total assets to the sum of bank capital and reserves) from their Hodrick–Prescott trend. They find some evidence that the Fed adjusted the interest rate to counteract the procyclical impact of a bank’s capital requirements, while the Bundesbank and the Bank of Japan did not. Bučif and Číhák (2008) estimate the monetary-policy response to seven alternative measures of financial-sector vulnerability (crisis probability, time to crisis, distance to default or credit default swap spreads) in a panel of 28 countries. Their empirical framework is different in the sense that the monetary-policy stance is proxied along the short-term interest rate by measures of domestic liquidity, and external shocks are controlled for. In the panel setting, they find a statistically significant negative response to many variables representing vulnerability (policy easing) but, surprisingly, not in country-level regressions. Belke and Klose (2010) investigate the factors behind the interest-rate decisions of the ECB and the Fed during the current crisis. They conclude that the estimated policy rule was significantly altered only for the Fed, and they put forward that the ECB gave greater weight to inflation stabilization at the cost of some output loss.

2.3. Measures of financial stress

The incidence and determinants of different types of crises have been typically traced in the literature by a means of narrative evidence (expert judgment). This has sometimes been complemented by selected indicators (exchange rate devaluation or the state of foreign reserves) that point to historical regularities (e.g., Eichengreen and Bordo, 2002; Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999; Reinhart and Rogoff, 2008; Laeven and Valencia, 2008). The empirical studies (e.g., Goldstein et al., 2000) used binary variables that were constructed based on these narratives.

Consequently, some contributions strived to provide more data-driven measures of financial stress. Most of the existing stress indices are based on high-frequency data, but they differ in the selected variables (bank capitalization, credit ratings, credit growth, interest rate spreads or volatility of different asset classes), country coverage, and the aggregation method. An important advantage of continuous stress indicators is that they may reveal periods of small-scale stress that did not result in full-blown crises and were neglected in studies based on binary crisis variables.

The Bank Credit Analyst (BCA) reports a monthly financial stress index (FSI) for the USA that is based on the performance of banking shares compared to the whole stock market, credit spreads and the slope of the yield curve, and new issues of stocks and bonds and consumer confidence. JP Morgan calculates a Liquidity, Credit and Volatility Index (LCVI) based on seven variables: the US Treasury curve error (the standard deviation of the spread between the on-the-run and off-the-run US Treasury bills and bonds along the entire maturity curve), the 10-year US swap spread, US high-yield spreads, JP Morgan’s Emerging Markets Bond Index, foreign exchange volatility (the weighted average of the 12-month implied volatilities of several currencies), the Chicago Board of Exchange VIX equity volatility index, and the JP Morgan Global Risk Appetite Index.

Illing and Liu (2006) develop a comprehensive FSI for Canada. Their underlying data cover equity, bond, and foreign exchange markets as well as the banking sector. They use a standard measure and refined measure of each stress component, where the former refers to the variables and their transformations that are commonly found in the literature, while the latter incorporates adjustments that allow for better extraction of information about stressful periods. They explore different weighting schemes to aggregate the individual series (factor analysis, the size of the corresponding market for total credit in the economy, variance-equal weighting). Finally, they perform an expert survey to identify periods that were perceived as especially stressful, confirming that the FSI matches these episodes very well.

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4 A similar but somewhat polemic debate applies to the role of exchange rates, especially for small, open economies (Taylor, 2001).
For the Fed Board of Governors, Carlson et al. (2009) propose a framework similar to the option-pricing model (Merton, 1974) that aims to provide the distance-to-default of the financial system, the so-called Index of Financial Health. The method uses the difference between the market value of a firm’s assets and liabilities and the volatility of the asset’s value to measure the proximity of a firm’s assets to being exceeded by their liabilities. They apply this measure to 25 of the largest US financial institutions, confirming its impact on capital investments in the US economy. The Kansas City Fed developed the Kansas City Financial Stress Index (Hakkio and Keeton, 2009), which is published monthly and is based on eleven variables (seven spreads between different bond classes by issuers, risk profiles and maturities, correlations between returns on stocks and Treasury bonds, expected volatility of overall stock prices, volatility of bank stock prices, and a cross-section dispersion of bank stock returns) that are aggregated by principal component analysis.

Finally, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) recently published financial stress indices for various countries. Cardarelli et al. (2011) propose a comprehensive index based on high-frequency data where the price changes are measured with respect to their previous levels or trend values. The underlying variables are standardized and aggregated into a single index (FSI) using variance–equal weighting for each country and period. The FSI has three subcomponents: the banking sector (the slope of the yield curve, TED spread, and the beta of banking-sector stocks), securities markets (corporate bond spreads, stock-market returns and time-varying volatility of stock returns) and exchange rates (time-varying volatility of NEER changes). Balakrishnan et al. (2009) modify the previous index to account for the specific conditions of emerging economies, on the one hand including a measure of exchange rate pressures (currency depreciation and decline in foreign reserves) and sovereign debt spread, and on the other hand downplaying the banking-sector measures (slope of the yield curve and TED spread). We will use the former index, given its comprehensiveness as well as its availability for different countries (see more details below).

3. Data and empirical methodology

3.1. The dataset


The dependent variable is typically an interest rate closely related to the official (censored) policy rate, in particular the federal funds rate (3M) for the USA, the discount rate (three-month Treasury bills) for the UK, Canada, and Sweden, and the three-month RBA-accepted bills rate for Australia. It is evident that the policy rate is not necessarily the only instrument that central banks use, especially during the 2008–2009 global financial crisis, when many unconventional measures were implemented (see Borio and Disyatat, 2009; Reis, 2010). To address this issue in terms of estimated policy rules, for a robustness check we use the interbank interest rate (at a maturity of three months). While both rates are used in empirical papers on monetary-policy rule estimation without great controversy, the selection of the interest rate becomes a more delicate issue during periods of financial stress (Taylor, 2008). While the former is more directly affected by genuine monetary-policy decisions (carried out by open market operations), the latter additionally includes liquidity conditions on interbank markets and, as such, can be affected by unconventional policies, though these are usually insulated (often intentionally) from policy interest rates. This is a drawback but also a potential advantage of this alternative dependent variable. On the one hand, changes in official policy rates may not pass through fully into interbank interest rates, in particular when the perceived counterparty risk is too high and credit spreads widen (see Taylor and Williams, 2009). On the other hand, the interbank rate may also incorporate the impact of policy actions, such as quantitative easing aimed at supplying additional liquidity into the system.

Inflation is measured as the year-on-year change in the CPI, apart from for the United States, where we use the personal consumption expenditures (PCE) price index, and Sweden, where underlying CPIX inflation (which excludes households’ mortgage-interest expenditures and the direct effects of changes in indirect taxes and subsidies from the CPI) is used. The output gap is proxied by the gap of the seasonally adjusted industrial production index derived by the Hodrick–Prescott filter with a smoothing parameter set to 14,400. For Sweden and Canada, where we use quarterly data, the output gap was taken as reported in the OECD Economic Outlook (production function method based on NAWRU – non-accelerating wage rate of unemployment).

We proxy financial stress by means of the FSI provided recently by the IMF (Cardarelli et al., 2011), which is a consistent measure for a wide range of countries but, at the same time, is sufficiently comprehensive to track stress of a different nature. It includes the main components of financial stress in an economy and is available for a reasonably long period to be used for our empirical analysis (see Fig. 1). We use both the overall index, which is a sum of seven components, as well as each sub-index and component separately:

(i) Banking-related sub-index components: the inverted term spread (the difference between short-term and long-term government bonds), TED spread (the difference between interbank rates and the yield on Treasury bills), banking beta

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5 The IMF Financial Stress Index has recently been applied by Melvin and Taylor (2009) to analyze exchange rate crises.

6 Borio and Disyatat (2009) characterize unconventional policies as policies that affect the central bank’s balance sheet size and composition and that can be insulated from interest rate policy (the so-called “decoupling principle”). One common example of such a policy (not necessarily used during times of crisis) is sterilized exchange-rate intervention. Given that we are looking at a single episode of stress, but rather want to identify whether monetary authorities deviated from systematic patterns (the policy rule) during these periods (by responding to indicators of financial stress), we need to use a consistent measure of policy action that is adjusted during periods of financial stress, though other measures may be in place as well. Therefore, we assume that the monetary-policy stance is fully reflected in the interest rate, and we are aware that it might be subject to downward bias on the financial-stress coefficient. The reader may want to interpret our results on the importance of financial stress for interest-rate setting as a conservative estimate.

7 There are other policy measures that can be used as a reactive or pre-emptive response to financial stress, such as regulatory or administrative measures, although their effects are likely to appear only in the longer term and cannot be reasonably included in our empirical analysis.

8 For Australia, the monthly CPI is not available because both the Reserve Bank of Australia and the Australian Bureau of Statistics only publish quarterly data. The monthly series was obtained using linear interpolation of the CPI index.

9 The industrial production cycle had to be used as a proxy for the output gap given that GDP data are not available at monthly frequency. Though a bit more volatile, it is highly correlated with the output gap from GDP (comparison at quarterly frequency). Moreover, industrial production data tend to be revised less often and to a lesser extent than the GDP data, which reduced the problem of real-time vs. ex-post data present in the GDP data.
(12-month rolling beta, which is a measure of the correlation of banking stock returns to total returns in line with the CAPM).

(ii) Securities-market-related sub-index components: corporate bond spread (the difference between corporate bonds and long-term government bond yields), stock-market returns (monthly returns multiplied by −1), time-varying stock-return volatility from the GARCH(1, 1) model.

(iii) Foreign-exchange-related sub-index: the time-varying volatility of monthly changes in NEER, from the GARCH(1, 1) model.

We examined various alternative methods of aggregating the components – simple sum, variance-equal weighting, and PCA weighting – but failed to uncover any systematic differences among these in terms of the values of the overall index and consequentially in the empirical results. Cardarelli et al. (2011) confirm that extreme values of this indicator correctly identify almost all (approximately 80–90%) of the financial crises (including banking, currency, and other crises, along with stock and house-price boom and busts) identified in previous studies.

Note: The figure presents the evolution of the IMF stress index over time. Higher numbers indicate more stress (see Cardarelli et al., 2011).

Fig. 1. IMF financial stress indicator. Note: The figure presents the evolution of the IMF stress index over time. Higher numbers indicate more stress (see Cardarelli et al., 2011).
The use of a composite index has a number of benefits. First, it approximates the evolution of financial stress caused by different factors and thus is not limited to one specific type of instability. Second, the inclusion of additional variables in the stress index does not affect the evolution of the indicator markedly (Cardarelli et al., 2011). Third, the composition of the indicator allows for breaking down the reactions of the central bank with respect to different stress subcomponents. Nevertheless, one has to be cautious about the interpretation. The composite indicator might suggest a misleading interpretation as long as the stress is caused by variables not included in the FSI but rather highly correlated with some subcomponent. An example is the case of Sweden during the ERM crisis. At the time of the crisis, Sweden maintained a fixed exchange rate, and the Riksbank sharply increased interest rates in order to sustain the parity. However, this is not captured by the exchange-rate subcomponent of the FSI, which measures exchange-rate volatility, because the volatility was actually close to zero. A closer examination of the data shows that this period of stress is captured by the inverted term structure; hence, it is incorrectly attributed to bank stress. A similar pattern can be observed for the UK, where the FSI increases after the announcement of withdrawal from the ERM.

### 3.2. The empirical model

Following Clarida et al. (1998a,b), most empirical studies assume that the central bank sets the nominal interest rate in line with the state of the economy typically in a forward-looking manner:

\[ r_t^* = \tilde{r} + \beta E[\pi_{t+i}|\Omega_t] + \gamma E[y_{t+i}|\Omega_t] \]  

where \( r_t^* \) denotes the targeted interest rate, \( \tilde{r} \) is the policy neutral rate, \( \pi_{t+i} \) stands for the central bank forecast of the yearly inflation rate, \( i \) indicates periods ahead based on an information set \( \Omega_t \) used for interest-rate decisions available at time \( t \), and \( \pi_{t+i} \) is the central bank’s inflation target. \( y_{t+i} \) represents a measure of the output gap.

Nevertheless, Eq. (1) was found to be too restrictive to provide a reasonable description of actual interest-rate setting. Notably, it does not account for interest-rate smoothing by central banks, in particular the practice whereby the central bank adjusts the interest rate sluggishly to the targeted value. This is tracked in empirical studies by the simple partial-adjustment mechanism:

\[ r_t = \rho r_{t-1} + (1 - \rho) r_t^* \]  

where \( \rho \in [0, 1] \) is the smoothing parameter. There is an ongoing controversy as to whether this parameter represents genuine policy inertia or reflects empirical problems related to omitted variables, dynamics or shocks (see, e.g., Rudebusch, 2006). The linear policy rule in Eq. (1) can be obtained as the optimal monetary-policy rule in the LQ framework, where the central bank aims only at price stability and economic activity. Bauducco et al. (2008) propose an NK model with a financial system where the central bank has privileged information (given its supervisory function) on the health of the financial sector. In such a setting, the common policy rule represented by Eq. (1) will be augmented by variables representing the health of the financial sector. Following this contribution, we consider the forward-looking rule where central banks may respond to a comprehensive measure of financial stress rather than stress in a particular segment (Bulif and Čihák, 2008).

In practice, the augmented rule can be of some interest to outsiders because inflation expected by the individual monetary-policy committee members is unobservable to the public (even though some central banks publish figures that may be very close to the unobserved expected inflation, such as staff inflation forecasts or inflation forecasts stemming from interactions between staff and monetary-policy committee members). In such case, outsiders may benefit from including additional indicators such as financial stress in the policy rule to predict the central bank’s behavior more accurately.

Therefore, we substitute Eq. (2) into Eq. (1), eliminate unobserved forecast variables and include measures of the financial stress described above, which results in Eq. (3):

\[ r_t = (1 - \rho) [\alpha + \beta (\pi_{t+i} - \pi_{t+i}^*) + \delta y_{t+i}] + \rho r_{t-1} + \delta x_{t+k} + \epsilon_t \]  

While in Eq. (1) the term \( \alpha \) coincides with the policy-neutral rate \( \tilde{r} \), its interpretation is not straightforward once the model is augmented by additional variables. Note that the financial stress index \( x_{t+k} \) does not appear within the square brackets. This is because it is typically not included in the loss function of central banks’ monetary policy but it is rather a factor such as the lagged interest rate, i.e., it may explain why the actual interest rate \( r_t \) deviates from the target. Moreover, by placing it in the regression at the same level as a lagged interest rate, we can directly test whether this variable representing ad hoc policy decisions decreases the interest-rate inertia \( \alpha \), as suggested by Mishkin (2009). At the same time, the response on the coefficient \( \delta \) can increase, as central banks are more likely to react to financial stress when stress is high. Consequently, it is possible that \( \alpha \) and \( \delta \) move in opposite directions because the central bank either smooths the interest-rate changes or adjusts the rates in the face of financial stress. In the latter case, the response is likely to be quiet and substantial. We set \( \delta \) equal to 6, \( \epsilon_t \) equal to 0 and \( k \) equal to \(-1\). Consequently, the disturbance term \( \epsilon_t \) is a combination of forecast errors and is thus orthogonal to all information available at time \( t \).

The empirical studies on monetary-policy rules have moved from using time-invariant estimates (Clarida et al., 1998a,b) through sub-sample analysis (Taylor, 1999; Clarida et al., 1998a,b) toward more complex methods that allow an assessment of the evolution of the conduct of monetary policy. There are two alternative methods for modeling structural changes in monetary-policy rules that occur on an unknown date: (i) regime-switching models, in particular state-dependent Markov switching models.

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10 The policy-neutral rate is typically defined as the sum of the real equilibrium rate and expected inflation.

11 An explicit definition of an inflation target exists only for countries with an inflation-targeting (IT) regime. Most empirical studies assume, in line with Taylor (1993), that this target does not vary over time and can be omitted from the empirical model.
and (ii) state-space models, where the changes are characterized by smooth transitions rather than abrupt switches (Boivin, 2006; Kim and Nelson, 2006; Trecroci and Vassalli, 2010). As argued in Baxa et al. (2010), we consider the second approach to be preferable for the estimation of policy rules, given that it is more flexible and allows for the incorporation of a simple correction of endogeneity (Kim, 2006; Kim and Nelson, 2006), which is a major issue in forward-looking policy rules estimated from ex-post data.13

The state-space approach, or time-varying coefficient model, also seems suitable when one wants to evaluate the effect of factors such as financial stress that can, for a limited length of time, alter (rather than permanently change) monetary-policy conduct.

State-space models are commonly estimated by means of a maximum likelihood estimator via the Kalman filter or smoother. Unfortunately, this approach has several limitations that can become problematic in applied work. First, the results are somewhat sensitive to the initial values of the parameters, which are usually unknown, especially in the case of variables whose impacts on the dependent variable are not permanent and whose sizes are unknown, which is the case for financial stress and its effect on interest rates. Second, the log likelihood function is highly non-linear, and in some cases optimization algorithms fail to minimize the negative of the log likelihood. In particular, it can either fail to calculate the Hessian matrix throughout the iteration process, or, when the likelihood function is approximated to facilitate computations, the covariance matrix of observation vectors can become singular for the starting values provided. The alternative is a moment-based estimator proposed by Schlicht (1981, 2005) and Schlicht and Ludsteck (2006), which is employed in our paper and briefly described below. This framework is sufficiently flexible such that it incorporates the endogeneity correction proposed by Kim (2006).

Kim (2006) shows that the conventional time-varying parameter model delivers inconsistent estimates when explanatory variables are correlated with the disturbance term and proposes an estimator of the time-varying coefficient model with endogenous regressors. Endogeneity may arise not only in forward-looking policy rules based on ex-post data (Kim and Nelson, 2006; Baxa et al., 2010) but also in the case of variables that have a two-sided relationship with monetary policy. Financial stress unquestionably enters this category. Following Kim (2006), we rewrite Eq. (3) as follows:

\[ r_t = (1 - \rho_t) [\alpha_t + \beta_t (\pi_{t-1} + \gamma_t y_{t-1} + \rho_t r_{t-1} + \delta_t x_{t+1} + \varepsilon_t] \]

\[ \alpha_t = \alpha_{t-1} + \theta_{1,t} \sim i.i.d. \ N(0, \sigma_{\alpha_1}^2) \]

\[ \beta_t = \beta_{2,t} + \theta_{2,t} \sim i.i.d. \ N(0, \sigma_{\beta_2}^2) \]

\[ \gamma_t = \gamma_{3,t} + \theta_{3,t} \sim i.i.d. \ N(0, \sigma_{\beta_3}^2) \]

\[ \delta_t = \delta_{4,t} + \theta_{4,t} \sim i.i.d. \ N(0, \sigma_{\beta_4}^2) \]

\[ \rho_t = \rho_{5,t} + \theta_{5,t} \sim i.i.d. \ N(0, \sigma_{\beta_5}^2) \]

\[ \pi_{t+1} = \pi_{t+1}^{DC4,\varepsilon} + \sigma_{\varepsilon} \psi_t \sim i.i.d. \ N(0, \sigma_{\varepsilon}^2) \]

\[ y_{t+1} = y_{t+1}^{DC4,\varepsilon} + \sigma_{\varepsilon} \nu_t \sim i.i.d. \ N(0, \sigma_{\nu}^2) \]

\[ x_{t+1} = x_{t+1}^{DC4,\varepsilon} + \sigma_{\varepsilon} \tau_t \sim i.i.d. \ N(0, \sigma_{\tau}^2) \]

The measurement Eq. (4) of the state-space representation is the monetary-policy rule. The transitions in Eqs. (5)–(9) describe the time-varying coefficients as a random-walk process without drift.14 Eqs. (10)–(12) track the relationship between the potentially endogenous regressors \((\pi_{t+1}, y_{t+1}, \text{ and } x_{t+1})\) and their instruments, \(Z_t\). We use the following instrumental variables: \(\pi_{t-1}, \pi_{t-2}, \pi_{t-4}\) for CAN and SWE; \(y_{t-1}, y_{t-2}, r_{t-1}\), the foreign interest rate for countries other than the United States (the three-month EURIBOR for SWE and UK, and the US three-month interbank rate for CAN and AUS). Unlike Kim (2006), we assume that the parameters in Eqs. (10)–(12) are time-invariant. The correlation between the standardized residuals \(\varphi_t, \nu_t, \text{ and } t_0\) and the error term \(\varepsilon_t\) is \(\kappa_{\varphi}, \kappa_{\nu}, \text{ and } \kappa_{t_0}\), respectively. Note that \(\sigma_{\varphi}, \sigma_{\nu}, \text{ and } \sigma_{t_0}\) are the standard errors of \(\varphi_t, \nu_t, \text{ and } t_0\), respectively. Consistent estimates of the coefficients in Eq. (4) are obtained in two steps. In the first step, we estimate Eqs. (10)–(12) and save the standardized residuals \(\varphi_t, \nu_t, \text{ and } t_0\). In the second step, we estimate Eq. (13) along with Eqs. (5)–(9). Note that Eq. (13) now includes bias correction terms, i.e., the (standardized) residuals from Eqs. (10)–(12), to address the aforementioned endogeneity of the regressors. Consequently, the estimated parameters in Eq. (13) are consistent, as \(\xi_t\) is uncorrelated with the regressors.

\[ r_t = (1 - \rho_t) [\alpha_t + \beta_t (\pi_{t-1} + \gamma_t y_{t-1} + \rho_t r_{t-1} + \delta_t x_{t+1} + \nu_t] + \kappa_{\varphi_t,\varepsilon} \varphi_t + \kappa_{\nu_t,\varepsilon} \nu_t + \kappa_{t_0,\varepsilon} t_0 + \xi_t, \]

\[ \xi_t \sim N(0, (1 - \kappa_{\varphi_t,\varepsilon}^2 - \kappa_{\nu_t,\varepsilon}^2 - \kappa_{t_0,\varepsilon}^2) \sigma_{\varepsilon}^2) \]

As previously noted, instead of the standard framework for second-step estimation, the maximum likelihood estimator via the Kalman filter (Kim, 2006), we use an alternative estimation framework, the “varying coefficients” (VC) method (Schlicht, 1981, 2005; Schlicht and Ludsteck, 2006). This method is a generalization of the ordinary least squares approach that, instead of minimizing the sum of the squares of the residuals \(\sum_{t=1}^{T} \xi_t^2\), uses minimization of the weighted sum of the squares:

\[ \sum_{t=1}^{T} \xi_t^2 + \theta_1 \sum_{t=1}^{T} \varphi_t^2 + \theta_2 \sum_{t=1}^{T} \nu_t^2 + \ldots + \theta_n \sum_{t=1}^{T} \xi_t^2 \]

where the weights \(\theta_t\) are the inverse variance ratios of the regression residuals \(\xi_t\) and the shocks in time-varying coefficients \(\varphi_t, \nu_t\), that is, \(\theta_t = \sigma_t^2 / \sigma_{\varepsilon}^2\). This approach balances the fit of the model and parameter stability. Additionally, the time averages of the regression coefficients, estimated by a weighted least squares estimator, are identical to their GLS estimates of the corresponding regression with fixed coefficients, that is, \((1/T) \sum_{t=1}^{T} \theta_t = \bar{\theta}_{GLS}^{G5,\varepsilon}\). The method is useful in our case because:

- it does not require knowledge of initial values even for non-stationary variables prior to the estimation procedure. Instead, both the variance ratios and the coefficients are estimated simultaneously;
- the property of the estimator that the time averages of the estimated time-varying coefficients are equal to its time-invariant counterparts, permits easy interpretation of the results in relation to time-invariant results;
- it coincides with the MLE estimator via the Kalman filter if the time series are sufficiently long and if the variance ratios are properly estimated.\(^\text{10}\) However, this method suffers from

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13 The time-varying parameter model with specific treatment of endogeneity is still relevant when real-time data are used (Orphanides, 2001). The real-time forecast is not derived under the assumption that nominal interest rates will remain constant within the forecasting horizon (Boivin, 2006) or in the case of measurement error and heteroscedasticity (Kim et al., 2006).

14 Note that while a typical time-invariant regression assumes that \(a_0 = a_{-1}\), in this case, it is assumed that \(\theta_0 = \theta_{-1}\).

15 See Schlicht and Ludsteck (2006) and Baxa et al. (2010) for more details.

16 The Kalman filter as implemented in common econometric packages typically uses the diffusion of priors for its initiation, but it still produces many corner
certain limitations of its own. In particular it requires that: (a) the time-varying coefficients are described as random walks, and (b) the shocks in time-varying coefficients $\theta_t$ are minimized (see Eq. (14)).

While this does not represent a major problem for the estimation of the coefficients of common variables such as inflation, where the monetary-policy response is permanent, it can lead to a loss of some information about ad hoc response factors in monetary policy making that are considered by central bankers only infrequently; however, once they are in place, the policy response can be substantial. The financial stress indicator $x_{tk}$ seems to be this kind of factor. One way to address this problem is by estimation-independent calibration of the variance ratios in Eq. (14), such that the estimated coefficient is consistent with economic logic, i.e., it is mostly insignificant and can become significant (with no prior restriction on its sign) during periods of financial stress, i.e., when the financial stress indicator is different from zero. Therefore, we first estimate Eq. (13) using the VC method and study whether the resulting coefficients in the FSI correspond to economic intuition, especially whether the coefficient is not constant or slowly moving (the so-called pile-up problem, see Stock and Watson, 1998). When this problem occurs, we compare the results with models where $k$ belongs to $(-2, -1, 0, 1, 2)$ and calibrate the variance ratios in Eq. (13) by the variance ratios estimated for the model with the largest variances in the FSI. This step was necessary for Australia and Sweden. The Taylor-rule coefficients were compared with the initial estimates and were consistent in both cases.

The results of our empirical analysis should reveal whether central banks adjusted their interest-rate policies in the face of financial stress. However, the time-varying framework also allows for inferring whether any response to financial stress led to the temporal dismissal of other targets, in particular the inflation rate. Therefore, we are mainly interested in the evolution of the financial-stress coefficient $\delta_t$. We expect it to be mostly insignificant or zero, given that episodes of financial stress are rather infrequent, and even if they occur, the monetary authorities may not always respond to them. Moreover, the size of the estimated coefficient does not have any obvious interpretation because the FSI is a composite indicator normalized to have a zero mean. Consequently, we define the stress effect as a product of the estimated coefficient $\delta_t$ and the value of the IMF’s FSI $x_{tk}$. The interpretation of the stress effect is straightforward: it shows the magnitude of interest-rate reactions to financial stress in percentage points or, in other words, the deviation from the target interest rate, as implied by the macroeconomic variables, due to the response to financial stress.

4. Results

This section summarizes our results on the effect of financial stress on interest-rate setting. First, the results on the effect of the overall measure of financial stress on interest-rate setting are presented. Second, the effect of specific components of financial stress on monetary policy is examined. Third, we briefly comment on the monetary-policy rule estimates that served as the input for the assessment of financial-stress effects. Finally, we perform a series of robustness checks.

4.1. Financial-stress effect

Fig. 2 presents our results on the effect of financial stress on interest-rate setting in all five countries (referred to as the financial-stress effect hereinafter). Although there is some heterogeneity across countries, some global trends in the effect of financial stress are apparent. Whereas in good times, such as in the second half of the 1990s, financial stress has virtually no effect on interest-rate setting or is slightly positive, the reaction of monetary authorities to financial stress was highly negative during the 2008–2009 global financial crisis. While the previous evidence on the effect of financial stress on monetary policy is somewhat limited, our results broadly confirm the time-invariant findings of Cecchetti and Li (2008), who show that the US Fed adjusted interest rates to the procyclical impact of bank capital requirements in 1989–2000. Similarly, Belke and Klose (2010) estimate the Taylor rule on two sub-samples (before and during the 2008–2009 global financial crisis) and find that the Fed reacted systematically not only to inflation and the output gap, but also to asset prices, credit, and money.

The size of financial-stress effects on interest-rate setting during the recent financial crisis is somewhat heterogeneous, with the strongest reaction found for the UK. The results suggest that all central banks except the Bank of England maintain policy rates at approximately 50–100 basis points lower compared to the counter-factual policy of no reaction to financial stress. The size of this effect for the UK is assessed to be approximately three times stronger (i.e., 250 basis points). This implies that approximately 50% of the overall policy-rate decrease during the recent financial crisis was motivated by financial-stability concerns in the UK (10%–30% in the remaining sample countries), while the remaining half falls to unfavorable developments in domestic economic activity. This finding complements previous results suggesting that the BoE’s consideration of expected inflation over the last decade has been very low (as found by Baxa et al., 2010, using the time-varying model and by Taylor and Davradakis, 2006, in the context of the threshold model) by evidence that it further decreased during the current crisis. It is also evident that the magnitude of the response is unusual for all five central banks. However, the results for Australia, Canada, and Sweden show a similar magnitude of response to financial stress during the recent financial crisis compared to that observed in previous periods of high financial stress.

Given that the 2008–2009 global crisis occurred at the end of our sample (there is a peak in the stress indicator of five standard deviations that has not returned to normal values yet), we performed an additional check to avoid possible end-point bias. In particular, we

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18 Given that the magnitude of the financial-stress effect differs across countries, especially due to the high positive peak for Sweden and negative peak for the UK, we use different scales for different countries.

19 Note that the positive effect of financial stress on interest-rate setting is to some extent a consequence of scaling the financial-stress indicator; its zero value corresponds to the long-run average stress. Hence, we do not pay much attention to positive values of stress unless caused by a temporarily positive and significant regression coefficient associated with the FSI.
Notes: The figure depicts the evolution of the financial-stress effect. The stress effect (y-axis) is defined as the product of the estimated coefficient on the financial-stress indicator in the monetary-policy rule and the value of the IMF financial-stress indicator ($\delta x$). The stress effect shows the magnitude of the interest-rate reaction to financial stress in percentage points.

Fig. 2. The effect of financial stress on interest-rate setting. Notes: The figure depicts the evolution of the financial-stress effect. The stress effect (y-axis) is defined as the product of the estimated coefficient on the financial-stress indicator in the monetary-policy rule and the value of the IMF financial-stress indicator ($\delta x$). The stress effect shows the magnitude of the interest-rate reaction to financial stress in percentage points.

ran our estimation excluding the observation from the period of the 2008–2009 crisis. These results were practically indistinguishable from the full sample estimation. With regard to the effect of the current crisis, the largest uncertainty is associated with the results for Canada, for which the shortest data sample – ending in the fourth quarter of 2008 – was available. When the possibility of a preemptive reaction of the central bank to financial stress is considered (see the robustness checks below), the effect of financial stress in the current crisis is estimated for Canada at somewhere between 1% and 2% (see Appendix 3). These additional results suggest that the response of the Bank of Canada in the benchmark model is likely to be underestimated.

The question of which components of financial stress influence interest-rate setting is addressed in Fig. 3. In this case, we estimate
the model using each FSI subcomponent separately (the bank stress effect, the exchange-rate stress effect, and the stock-market stress effect) instead of the overall FSI and report the financial-stress effect attributable to each subcomponent. Some heterogeneity across countries is again apparent, although it seems that bank stress and stock-market stress dominated central bankers’ considerations in less open economies. On the other hand, exchange-rate stress matters in more open economies such as Canada and Sweden.

Specifically, the US Fed seemed to be worried about financial instability, especially during the 1980s. We can observe that the main concern in the early 1980s was banking stress, which is
arguably related to the Savings and Loans crisis. Another concern was that of stock-market stress, in particular during the stock-market crash of 1987, when interest rates were 30 b.p. lower with respect to the benchmark case.

The Bank of England was, in general, much more perceptive to financial stress. We find its response mainly to stock-market stress again, notably, in 1987. Interestingly, we find little response to exchange-rate stress, not even during the 1992 ERM crisis. Nevertheless, it has to be emphasized that the interest-rate reaction to this speculative attack was subdued in comparison to, for example, the Riksbank (Buter et al., 1998). The base rate was increased by 2 p.p. to 12% on September 16, 1992. Despite a promise of further increases up to 15%, traders continued selling the pound. On the evening of the same day, the UK left the ERM with interest rates unchanged; on the following day, the base rate decreased to 10.5%; and at the end of September, the base rate was 9%, lower than at the beginning of the month. Therefore, despite huge open market operations, the response of the interest rate was moderate, with the monthly interest-rate average practically unaffected. Hence, our framework does not detect any effect of financial stress on the interest rate during the ERM crisis. Since the devaluation of the pound sterling in September 1992, the effect of financial stress on interest-rate setting approaches zero from originally negative values. Aside from this, the response of the Bank of England to inflation has decreased. From this perspective, it seems the pound sterling’s withdrawal from the ERM allowed for both a more rule-based and less restrictive monetary policy. With respect to the banking crisis in the late 2000s, the Bank of England provided liquidity support in its earlier stage in 2007 with the fall of Northern Rock. Policy rates remained constant until late 2008, despite the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in the US in September 2008. The reason for keeping policy rates constant was related to concerns regarding potential inflationary pressures from rising oil and food prices.

The interest-rate effect of the banking crisis in Sweden in the early 1990s is estimated to be slightly over 1% in absolute terms (see Fig. 2). The crisis began in September 1990, when the non-banking financial institution Nyckeln unexpectedly collapsed (Jennergren, 2002). The Riksbank did not decrease interest rates sharply because coincidental international factors, in particular the reunification of Germany, forced interest rates upwards. Despite facing recession, the government attempted to defend the peg of the krona to ECU and decided to prevent the spread of the banking crisis by announcing a blanket guarantee for the liabilities of the banking sector (Jonung, 2009). Hence, interest-rate cuts were not a primary tool chosen for resolution of the crisis.

In comparison to the United Kingdom, the reaction of the Riksbank to the ERM crisis was different. First, after a series of speculative attacks on the Swedish krona in mid-September 1992, the Riksbank still attempted to maintain the fixed exchange rate, and the marginal interest rate jumped up 550% to offset the outflow of liquidity and other speculative attacks (see the large positive stress effect on the interest rate in 1992 in Fig. 2). However, not even such an increase was sufficient, and the fixed exchange rate had to be abandoned later, in November.20

The Reserve Bank of Australia significantly loosened its policy during the 1980s. This can be attributed to stress in the banking sector with the exception of the reaction to the stock-market crash in 1987 (see Fig. 3).

The exchange rate as well as bank stress seems to matter for interest-rate considerations at the Bank of Canada. Interestingly, the results suggest that the Bank of Canada often responded to higher exchange-rate stress by monetary tightening. A possible explanation for this finding might be that given the openness of the Canadian economy, its central bank tightened the policy when the currency stabilized at the level that the monetary authority considered to be undervalued.

We would like to highlight a comparison of Figs. 2 and 3. First, it should be noted that a positive response to one stress subcomponent may cancel out in the face of a negative response to another one, making the response to the overall stress negligible (as in the case of Canada). Second, the stress effects related to individual subcomponents do not necessarily sum up to the stress effect related to the entire FSI.

Overall, the results suggest that the central bank tends to react to financial stress, and different components of financial stress matter in different time periods. The effect of financial stress on interest-rate setting is found to be virtually zero in good times and economically sizable during periods of high financial stress.

4.2. Monetary policy rule estimates

Given that our main interest lies in the interest-rate response to financial stress, we comment on the other monetary-policy rule estimates only briefly. The plot of the evolution of the estimated parameters over time for all countries is available in Appendix 1. First of all, it should be noted that most coefficients do indeed vary over time, which is consistent with previous evidence and underlines the fact that monetary-policy conduct has evolved substantially in recent decades.

In general, the responses to inflation (β) are positive, and the coefficient is often above one, consistent with the Taylor principle. Nevertheless, we find that in the last decade the coefficient decreased somewhat, and during the recent financial crisis it even turned slightly negative (in the US and UK; more on this below). The decrease of the inflation response during the last decade is typically attributed to well-anchored inflation expectations as well as a low-inflation environment (Sekine and Teranishi, 2008; Baxa et al., 2010). The finding of negative β during the recent crisis is likely to be related to the fact that central banks were decreasing policy rates to historical lows in the face of exceptionally high financial stress, despite inflation expectations being largely unchanged, rather than being an indication that policy rates were systematically decreased when inflation expectations increased.

For the United States, our results show that the response to inflation was highest in the early 1980s, and except for the period following the recession of 1990–1991 the estimated coefficient is higher or very close to one. This value is slightly lower in comparison to Kim and Nelson (2006), who found the response to be around 1.5 and almost invariant since 1981. Given the size of the confidence intervals, it is, however, difficult to determine whether our results differ significantly. Kim and Nelson (2006) estimate the interest-rate smoothing coefficient to be higher than 0.8, i.e., in line with what time-invariant estimates of monetary-policy rules typically suggest (see, for example, Clarida et al., 1998a,b). Our estimates indicate that the interest-rate smoothing is somewhat lower (0.5–0.6). This finding is in line with the recent critique by Rudebusch (2006), who argues that the practical unpredictability of interest-rate changes over a few quarters suggests that the degree of interest-rate smoothing is rather low. Interestingly, we find that

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20 For Sweden, we add a dummy variable for the third quarter of 1992 (ERM crisis) to Eq. (13). At this time, the Swedish central bank forced short-term interest rates upward in an effort to keep the krona within the ERM. From the perspective of our model, it was a case of a strong positive reaction to the actual stress that lasted only one period. When this dummy variable was not included, the model with a lagged value of the FSI was unable to show any link between stress and interest rates, and the estimates of other coefficients were inconsistent with economic intuition. Clearly, since we use data at monthly and quarterly frequency, this limits the possibility to detect and properly analyze day-to-day dynamics of some short-term instability events.
the response to inflation decreases substantially after the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. This complies with Greenspan (2007), who argued in that case that the Fed was concerned about the US economy spiraling downward into recession after the terrorist attacks. Later, Greenspan himself acknowledged that the monetary policy was somewhat loose, but ex ante optimal, given the increased uncertainty after the attacks. In a similar vein, Taylor (2010) compares the actual values of the federal funds rate and the counterfactual values predicted by the (time-invariant) Taylor rule, finding that in 2002–2005 interest rates were too low compared to predictions and this deviation from a rules-based policy was “larger than in any period since the unstable decade before the Great Moderation” (p. 167). Negative estimates of the response to inflation in this particular period are reported also by Trecroci and Vassalli (2010). The response to the output gap is significant for nearly the whole sample, although the values close to 0.2 are somewhat lower than in Kim–Nelson (2007), but similar to Trecroci and Vassalli (2010).

The results for countries that currently have an explicit target for inflation share several features. The interest-rate smoothing is again found to be lower in comparison to time-invariant estimates, with midpoints around 0.5. The exception is Canada, where the values fluctuate around zero and are insignificant. Moreover, for some central banks, such as the RBA and the BoE in 2010 or the Sveriges Riksbank in late 1980, we find that central banks are less inertial during crises.\(^\text{21}\) Second, the response of interest rates to inflation is particularly strong during the periods when central bankers want to break a record of high inflation, such as in the UK or Australia at the beginning of the 1980s, and is less aggressive in a low-inflation environment with subdued shocks and well-anchored inflation expectations (Kuttner and Posen, 1999). In this respect, our results confirm the findings of Taylor and Davradakis (2006), who argue that the response of the Bank of England to inflation is insignificant when the inflation rate is close to its target. Third, some central banks (Australia and Canada) are also found to react to output-gap developments, with the parameter estimated to be slightly positive on average, whereas the parameter is insignificant with wide confidence intervals in Sweden and the United Kingdom.

The results show that the interest-rate response to financial stress is insignificant most of the time, at the 95% significance level. This is in line with our expectations, i.e., that the coefficients should be insignificant in periods when stress is low. Nevertheless, the coefficient on financial stress is statistically significant at the 95% level during the recent financial crises for most countries. The importance of financial stress for interest-rate setting is further confirmed using the GMM estimation, which shows that the financial-stress index is significant, in fact, in all countries. In addition, when the one-standard-deviation quantile is taken into account instead of the more usual two-standard-deviation quantile, the periods when we can identify any interest-rate response to financial stress become more evident. We present a list of these periods in Table A5.2.

4.3. Robustness checks

In terms of the financial-stress effect estimates, we perform a battery of robustness checks. First, following the argument put

\(^{21}\) Indeed, the correlation coefficient of the estimated time-varying coefficient of the lagged interest rate $\rho$ and the financial-stress index $\delta$ is $-0.79$ for Australia, $0.21$ for Canada, $-0.20$ for Sweden, $-0.68$ for the UK, and $0.60$ for the US.
Response to inflation ($\beta$)

Response to output gap ($\gamma$)

Interest rate smoothing ($\rho$)

Response to financial stress ($\delta$)

Note: The estimated coefficients of the time-varying monetary policy rule are depicted with a 95% confidence interval.

**Fig. A1.2.** Time-varying monetary policy rules: UK. *Note:* The estimated coefficients of the time-varying monetary policy rule are depicted with a 95% confidence interval.

Response to inflation ($\beta$)

Response to output gap ($\gamma$)

Interest rate smoothing ($\rho$)

Response to financial stress ($\delta$)

Note: The estimated coefficients of the time-varying monetary policy rule are depicted with a 95% confidence interval.

**Fig. A1.3.** Time-varying monetary policy rules: Sweden. *Note:* The estimated coefficients of the time-varying monetary policy rule are depicted with a 95% confidence interval.
Note: The estimated coefficients of the time-varying monetary policy rule are depicted with a 95% confidence interval.

Fig. A1.4. Time-varying monetary policy rules: Australia. Note: The estimated coefficients of the time-varying monetary policy rule are depicted with a 95% confidence interval.

Fig. A1.5. Time-varying monetary policy rules: Canada. Note: The estimated coefficients of the time-varying monetary policy rule are depicted with a 95% confidence interval.
Notes: The figure depicts the evolution of the financial-stress effect. The stress effect (y-axis) is defined as the product of the estimated coefficient on the financial-stress indicator in the monetary-policy rule and the value of the IMF financial-stress indicator ($\delta_t$). The stress effect shows the magnitude of the interest-rate reaction to financial stress in percentage points.

Fig. A2.1. The effect of financial stress on interest-rate setting. Notes: The figure depicts the evolution of the financial-stress effect. The stress effect (y-axis) is defined as the product of the estimated coefficient on the financial-stress indicator in the monetary-policy rule and the value of the IMF financial-stress indicator ($\delta_t$). The stress effect shows the magnitude of the interest-rate reaction to financial stress in percentage points.

forward above that the interbank rate may occasionally provide a better signal of monetary-policy intentions than the policy rate, we use interbank interest rates as a dependent variable. These results are reported in Figs. A2.1 and A2.2. We can observe that the overall stress effect on the interbank rate was larger for the US during the current crisis, where it explains 2% of the decrease of the interbank interest rate. For Sweden, we found a strong positive effect of exchange rate volatility in the late 1980s; this might be linked to the aim of the central bank to keep the exchange rate fixed. In other cases, there is no substantial difference between the benchmark results and the results obtained using this alternative dependent variable.

Second, in the benchmark model and all of the results reported thus far, we use the first lag of the FSI in the policy-rule estimation.
We motivate this choice by the use of monthly data, the frequency of monetary-policy meetings of most central-bank boards, and the assumption that policy actions are likely to be implemented in a timely fashion. In addition, we employ different lags and leads, in the latter case allowing the policy to be preemptive rather than reactive. In this case, we use the future realized value of the FSI as a proxy for the central bank’s expectation (in a similar manner as to how it is routinely executed for inflation expectations.)
and, consequently, treat the FSI as an endogenous variable (see Fig. A3.1 for the results). To obtain comparable results, we calibrate the variance ratios with the same values as in the baseline specification. Although we find rather mixed evidence on preemptive policy actions, which may also be related to the inadequacy of proxying the expected values of financial stress by the actual values of the financial-stress indicator as well as the fact that a central bank might not react to the stress preemptively, the reaction to financial stress in the current crisis is strongly negative for both expected and observed stress.

Third, we further break down the FSI sub-indices to each underlying variable to evaluate their individual contributions. The corresponding stress effects appear in Figs. A4.1 and A4.2. Breaking down stock-market-related stress, we find that the US Fed and the BoC react to the corporate bond spread, whereas the BoE and Sveriges Riksbank are more concerned with stock returns and volatility. While the RBA seems to be concerned with both corporate bond spreads and stock-market volatility in the 1980s, the role of stock-related stress had substantially decreased by then. As far as bank-related stress is concerned, the TED spread plays a major role in all countries apart from the UK, where the largest proportion of the effect on the interest rate can be attributed to an inverted term structure.

Fourth, because the verifications related to comparing our econometric framework to obvious alternatives such as, first, the use of a maximum likelihood estimator via the Kalman filter instead of the moment-based time-varying coefficient framework of Schlicht and, second, the use of a Markov switching model instead of a state-space model, were provided in Baxa et al. (2010), we estimate simple time-invariant monetary-policy rules for each country by the generalized method of moments, including various subsamples. This simple evidence reaffirms that the analyzed central banks seem to pay attention to overall financial stress in the economy. The FSI is statistically significant, with a negative sign and a magnitude of between 0.05 and 0.20 for all countries. On the other hand, the coefficients of its subcomponents often are not significant, and the exchange-rate subcomponent in some cases has a positive sign. These results, which are available upon request, confirm that to understand the interest-rate adjustment in response to financial stress, one should rely on a model allowing for a differential response across time.

5. Concluding remarks

The 2008–2009 global financial crisis generated significant interest in exploring the interactions between monetary policy and
financial stability. This paper aimed to examine in a systematic manner whether and how the monetary policy of selected main central banks (the US Fed, the Bank of England, the Reserve Bank of Australia, the Bank of Canada, and Sveriges Riksbank) responded to episodes of financial stress over the last three decades. Instead of using individual alternative measures of financial stress in different markets, we employed the comprehensive indicator of financial stress recently developed by the International Monetary Fund, which tracks overall financial stress as well as its main sub-components, in particular banking stress, stock-market stress and exchange-rate stress.

Unlike a few existing empirical contributions that aim to evaluate the impact of financial-stability concerns on monetary policy making, we adopt a more flexible methodology that not only allows for the response to financial stress (and other macroeconomic variables) to change over time, but also addresses potential endogeneity (Kim and Nelson, 2006). The main advantage of this framework is that it not only enables testing of whether central banks responded to financial stress at all, but also detects the periods and types of stress that were the most worrying for monetary authorities. Our results indicate that central banks truly change their policy stances in the face of financial stress, but the magnitude of such responses varies substantially over time. As expected, the impact of financial stress on interest-rate setting is essentially zero most of the time, when the levels of stress are very moderate. However, most central banks loosen monetary policy
Fig. A4.2. The effect of stock-market stress on interest-rate setting.

when the economy faces high financial stress. There is some cross-country and time heterogeneity when we examine central banks’ considerations of specific types of financial stress. While most central banks seem to respond to stock-market stress and bank stress, exchange-rate stress is found to drive the reaction of central banks only in more open economies.

Consistent with our expectations, the results indicate that a sizeable fraction of the monetary-policy easing during the 2008–2009 financial crisis can be explained by a direct response to the financial stress above what might be attributed to the decline in inflation expectations and output below its potential. However, the size of the financial-stress effect differs by country. The result suggests that all central banks except the Bank of England kept their policy rates at 50–100 basis points lower, on average, solely due to the financial stress present in the economy. Interestingly, the size of this effect for the UK is assessed at about three times stronger (i.e., 250 basis points). This implies that about 50% of the overall policy-rate decrease during the recent financial crisis was motivated by financial-stability concerns in the UK (10%–30% in the remaining sample countries), while the remaining half falls to unfavorable developments in domestic economic activity. For the US Fed, macroeconomic developments themselves (a low-inflation environment and output substantially below its potential) explain the majority of the interest-rate policy decreases during the crisis, leaving any further response to financial stress to be constrained by zero interest rates.
Overall, our results point to the usefulness of augmenting the standard version of monetary-policy rules by some measure of financial conditions to obtain a better understanding of the interest-rate-setting process, especially when financial markets are unstable. The empirical results suggest that the central banks considered in this study altered the course of their monetary policy in the face of financial stress. The recent crisis seems truly to be an exceptional period, in the sense that the response to financial instability was substantial and coincided in all the countries analyzed, which is evidently related to intentional policy coordination absent in previous decades. However, we have also observed that previous idiosyncratic episodes of financial distress were, at least in some countries, followed by monetary-policy responses of similar, if not higher, magnitude.

Table A5.1
Time-invariant reaction functions, GMM estimates.

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Notes: Numbers in ( ) are standard errors. The samples are as follows: United States: 1981:1M–2009:6M, United Kingdom: 1981:1M–2009:3M, Australia: 1983:3M–2009:5M, Sweden 1984:2Q–2009:1Q, Canada 1981:1Q–2008:4Q. Model 1: $\tau_1 * (1-\rho)(\alpha + \beta \tau_{t-1} + \gamma y_{t-1} + \rho \tau_{t-1} + \delta y_{t-1})$. Model 2 does not contain financial stress; $\eta_1 = (1-\rho)(\alpha + \beta \tau_{t-1} + \gamma y_{t-1} + \rho \tau_{t-1} + \delta y_{t-1})$. $k$ equals 6 for the USA, the UK and Australia, 2 for Sweden and 4 for Canada. For Sweden, a dummy variable for the third quarter of 1992 (the RM crisis) is included. The coefficient is significant at the 5% level, when the ratio of coefficient to standard error is greater than 1.96.

Both models are estimated using the GMM. The list of instruments follows. United States: lags of interest rate, output gap, inflation, and financial stress (1–6, 9, 12), model 2 without lags of FSI in a set of instruments. United Kingdom: lags of interest rate, output gap, inflation, and EURIBOR 3M (1–6, 9, 12), FSI (1–3). Australia: interest rate, inflation, output gap, US money market rate and FSI (1–6, 9, 12). Sweden: lags of interest rate, inflation, output gap, EURIBOR 3M, and FSI (1–4) + the dummy for the ERM crisis. Canada: interest rate, inflation, output gap, U.S. money market rate, and FSI (1–4).

Additionally, we show the results for the USA estimated on the subsample 1981–1999. The model denoted as 1* has the output gap derived from the quadratic trend of log industrial production in a similar fashion as in Clarida et al. (1998a,b). Their results are provided for comparison with ours.

Table A5.2
Periods with significant responses to financial stress.

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<tr>
<td>15D</td>
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<tr>
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Acknowledgments

We thank Aleš Bulíř, Sofia Bauducco, Öyvind Eitreim, Dana Hájková, Bernhard Herz, Ekkehart Schlicht, Miloslov Vošvrdá, and seminar participants at the 7th Norges Annual Monetary Policy Conference, the 15th International Conference on Macroeconomic Analysis and International Finance (Rethymno, Greece), the Bank of England, the Czech National Bank, the Institute of Information Theory and Automation (Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic), Universitat de Barcelona, Universitat de Girona, Universitat de les Illes Balears, and Universidad Computense de Madrid for helpful discussions. The views expressed in this paper are not necessarily those of the Czech National Bank. This research was supported by the Grant Agency of the Czech Republic, project no. P402/11/1487.

Appendix 1. Time-varying monetary policy rule estimates (Figs. A1.1–A1.5)

Appendix 2. The results with the interbank rate as the dependent variable in the policy rule

Appendix 3. The results with different leads and lag of the FSI

Appendix 4. The results with individual variables of bank stress and stock-market stress

Appendix 5. Significance of the financial stress index in the estimated Taylor rules (Tables A5.1 and A5.2)

References

Bulíř, A., Čihák, M., 2008. Central bankers’ dilemma when banks are vulnerable: to tighten or not to tighten? IMF mimeo.


