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#### Abstract

General belief functions usually bear some internal conflict which comes mainly from disjoint focal elements. Analogously, there is often some conflict between two (or more) belief functions. After the recent observation of hidden conflicts (seminar CJS'17 [17]), appearing at belief functions with disjoint focal elements, importance of interest in conflict of belief functions has increased.

This theoretical contribution introduces a new approach to conflicts (of belief functions). Conflicts are considered independently of any combination rule and of any distance measure.

Consonant conflicts are based on consonant approximations of belief functions in general; two special cases of the consonant approach based on consonant inverse pignistic and consonant inverse plausibility transforms are discussed.

Basic properties of the newly defined conflicts are presented, analyzed and briefly compared with our original approaches to conflict (combinational conflict, plausibility conflict and comparative conflict), with the recent conflict based on non-conflicting parts, as well as with W. Liu's degree of conflict.

## 1 Introduction

Belief functions (BFs; introduced in [25]) are one of the widely used formalisms for uncertainty representation and processing - that enables representation of incomplete and uncertain knowledge, belief updating, and combination of evidence.

Complications with highly conflicting belief functions combination, see e.g., [9, 28], have motivated a theoretical investigation of conflicts between belief functions [2, 4, 11, 18, 21, 22, 23, 24]. The problematic issue of an essence of conflict between belief functions - originally defined by the non-normalised version of Dempster's rule  $\odot$  (i.e., by its value for the empty set:  $m_{\odot}(\emptyset)$ ) - was first mentioned by Almond [1], and discussed further by W. Liu [22]. Almond's counter-example has

been overcome by W. Liu's progressive approach. Unfortunately, the substance of the issue has not been solved there as positive conflict still may be detected for non-conflicting BFs.

Further steps ahead were presented in our previous study [11] where new ideas concerning interpretation, definition, and measurement of conflicts of BFs were introduced. Three new approaches to interpretation and computation of conflicts were suggested: combinational conflict, plausibility conflict (see also [13, 14]), and comparative conflict; pignistic conflict analogous to plausibility one was defined later in [14]. Unfortunately, none of those captures the nature of conflict sufficiently enough ands these approaches need further elaboration. Nevertheless, the very important distinction between conflict of two BFs and the internal conflict of an individual BF was pointed out in [11] - altogether with the necessity to distinguish between a conflict and a difference/distance of two BFs; this was also pointed out in [3].

Probabilistic approximations of belief functions were used in several previous approaches, e.g. pignistic transform in W. Liu's two-dimensional degree of conflict [22] and in pignistic conflict [14], normalized plausibility of singletons in plausibility conflict [11, 13, 14], etc.

Unfortunately, application of a probability approximation adds a new additional information, which increases internal conflict of inputs and also resulting in a global conflict. The new reverse approach suggested in this paper adds no new information but removes an information creating the internal conflicts, as inverse probabilistic transformations are used to make consonant approximations. This is an analogy to belief discounting, but without necessity of any parameter due to its specific context. Thus BFs without internal conflicts are used for a computation of a conflict; it is a generalization of the approach from [15] in fact.

## 2 Preliminaries

#### 2.1 General Primer on Belief Functions

We assume classic definitions of basic notions from theory of *belief functions* [25] on a finite frame of discernment  $\Omega_n = \{\omega_1, \omega_2, ..., \omega_n\}$ . A *basic belief assignment (bba)* is a mapping  $m : \mathcal{P}(\Omega) \longrightarrow [0, 1]$  such that  $\sum_{A \subseteq \Omega} m(A) = 1$ ; the values of the bba are called *basic belief masses (bbm)*.  $m(\emptyset) = 0$  is usually assumed - then we speak about normalized bba. A belief function (BF) is a mapping  $Bel : \mathcal{P}(\Omega) \longrightarrow [0, 1]$ ,  $Bel(A) = \sum_{\emptyset \neq X \subseteq A} m(X)$ . A plausibility function  $Pl : \mathcal{P}(\Omega) \longrightarrow [0, 1]$ , Pl(A) = $\sum_{\emptyset \neq A \cap X} m(X)$ . There is a unique correspondence among m and corresponding Bel and Pl thus we often speak about m as about belief function.

A focal element is a subset X of the frame of discernment, such that m(X) > 0. Let  $\mathcal{F} = \{X \mid m(X) > 0\}$  be the set of all focal elements; and *core* be its union  $\mathcal{C} = \bigcup_{X \in \mathcal{F}} X$ . If all the focal elements are *singletons* (i.e. one-element subsets of  $\Omega$ ), then we speak about a *Bayesian belief function* (BBF). If all the focal elements are either singletons or whole  $\Omega$  (i.e. |X| = 1 or  $|X| = |\Omega|$ ), then we speak about a quasi-Bayesian belief function (qBBF). If all focal elements have non-empty intersections, we call this a consistent belief function. And if all focal elements are nested, we call this a consonant belief function. Vacuous BF (VBF) has the only focal element  $\Omega$ :  $m_{vac}(\Omega) = 1$ . A symmetric BF is a BF, which has the same bbms for focal elements with the same cardinality, i.e., m(X) = m(Y) for |X| = |Y|.

Let us recall normalized plausibility of singletons<sup>1</sup> of Bel: the BBF (probability distribution)  $Pl_{-}P(Bel)$  such, that  $(Pl_{-}P(Bel))(\omega_i) = \frac{Pl(\{\omega_i\})}{\sum_{\omega \in \Omega} Pl(\{\omega\})}$  [5, 10]; and alternative Smets' pignistic probability<sup>2</sup>  $BetP(\omega_i) = \sum_{\omega_i \in X} \frac{m(X)}{|X|}$  [27].

## 2.2 A Graphical Presentation of Sets of Belief Functions

We can represent any BF on an *n*-element frame of discernment  $\Omega_n$  by an enumeration of its *m* values (bbms), i.e., by a  $(2^n-2)$ -tuple  $(x_1, x_2, ..., x_{2^n-2})$  as  $m(\emptyset) = 0$ and  $m(\Omega) = x_{2^n-1} = 1 - \sum_{i=1}^{2^n-2} x_i$ . Thus we can present set of all BFs on  $\Omega_n$  by a  $(2^n-2)$ -dimensional simplex in general. Specially we have 2D triangle and 6D simplex for  $\Omega_2$  and  $\Omega_3$ , see Figure 1 [19, 20] and Figure 2 [12].



Figure 1: Belief functions on 2-element frame  $\Omega_2$ ; G: Bayesian BFs, S: symmetric BFs,  $S_1, S_2$ : simple support BFs ( $\sim$  consonant BFs on  $\Omega_2$ ).

Figure 2: Simplex of Belief functions on 3element frame  $\Omega_3$ . 6 dimensions corresponds to 6 possible focal elements. Figure 3: Internal conflict Pl-IntC on  $\Omega_2$ . It has max value  $\frac{1}{2}$  for 0', decreases along arrows, constant along lines without arrows; zero at  $S_i$ 's.

## **3** Conflicts of Belief Functions

Conflicts of belief functions are caused mainly by disjoint focal elements either within individual BFs or in different BFs. Internal conflicts  $IntC(m_i)$  of individual BFs are distinguished from conflict between BFs  $Conf(m_1, m_2)$  [11]; the entire sum of multiples of mutually conflicting masses is called total conflict  $TotC(m_1, m_2)^3$ .

 $<sup>{}^{1}</sup>Pl_{-}P(Bel)$  is a normalization of contour function (of plausibility of singletons [25]) in fact.

 $<sup>^{2}</sup>$ We have to note an analogy between pignistic probability and Shapley value [26].

 $<sup>^{3}</sup>$ Some authors (see e.g. [18]) use 'total conflict' for maximal possible conflict, which arises when all focal elements of one BF are disjoint with focal element of another BFs. Our total

## 3.1 Internal Conflict of Belief Functions

Internal conflict of a BF is caused either by its disjoint focal elements (if there are any), or if  $Pl(\{\omega\}) < 1$  for every  $\omega \in \Omega$  (i.e.  $\forall \omega \in \Omega$  exists focal element  $X_{\omega}$  such that  $omega \notin X_{\omega}$ ). Let us accept the following simple definition of internal conflict<sup>4</sup>: Internal conflict of BF Bel is defined by formula  $IntC(Bel) = 1 - max_{\omega \in \Omega}Pl(\{\omega\})$ , where Pl is the plausibility corresponding to Bel. A BF Bel is (internally) non-conflicting when it has zero internal conflict IntC(Bel) = 0; it is (internally) conflicting otherwise. This definition corresponds to internal plausibility conflict Pl-IntC(Bel) from [11], see Section 4.1.

Thus a BF is non-conflicting if and only if there is an  $\omega \in \Omega$  such that  $Pl(\{\omega\}) = 1$  (or in other words if BF is consistent).

## 3.2 Conflicts between Belief Functions

There are several different assumptions about conflicts between belief functions in our previous approaches [11, 13, 14, 15]. Some of them are mutually conflicting as coming from various alternative approaches, thus we suppose only those common:

A1. Non-negativity and boundary conditions:  $0 \leq Conf(Bel_1, Bel_2) \leq 1$ .

- A2. Symmetry:  $Conf(Bel_1, Bel_2) = Conf(Bel_2, Bel_1).$
- A3. Conf(Bel, Bel) = 0. A BF is not conflicting with itself.
- A4.  $Conf(Bel, Bel_{vac}) = 0$ . Vacuous BF is non-conflicting with any other BF.

The other assumptions in our previous approaches are stronger and they distinguish among various approaches. Thus we do not consider them among our general assumptions here. We may compare our assumptions with Martin's axioms MA1 – MA5 [23] and Destercke & Burger properties P3 – P6 [18]:

- $(MA1): Conf(Bel', Bel'') \ge 0,$
- (MA2): Conf(Bel, Bel) = 0,
- (MA3): Conf(Bel', Bel'') = Conf(Bel'', Bel'),
- (MA4):  $Conf(Bel', Bel'') \le 1$ ,
- (MA5):  $Conf(Bel'_{Bel''}) = 0$  iff  $m' \subseteq m$ " or  $m'' \subseteq m''^{5}$ .

$$\begin{array}{rll} (\mathrm{P3}): & \mathrm{Extreme \ values:} & Conf(Bel_1, Bel_2) = 0 & \mathrm{iff} & \bigcap_{X \in \mathcal{F}_1 \cup \mathcal{F}_2} \neq \emptyset & \mathrm{iff} \\ & \mathrm{iff} & \sum_{X \cap Y = \emptyset} m_1(X)m_2(Y) = 0) & \mathrm{iff} & \mathcal{P}_{m_1} \cap \mathcal{P}_{m_2} \neq \emptyset, \\ & & \mathrm{where} \ \mathcal{P}_m = \{Prob \mid Bel(X) \leq Prob(A), \ \forall X \subseteq \Omega\}; \\ & Conf(Bel_1, Bel_2) = 1 & \mathrm{iff} & \mathcal{C}_1 \cap \mathcal{C}_2 = \emptyset. \end{array}$$

- (P4) : Symmetry.
- (P5) : Imprecision monotonicity.
- (P6) : 'Ignorance is Bliss'  $\sim Conf(Bel, Bel_{vac}) = 0.$

conflict correspond to their global conflict.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup>Let us note, that there are different approaches how to define internal conflict of BFs, e.g., using minnimal entropy functional, see [2], or using author's conflicting parts of BFs [12].

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup>A very special case of belief specialization:  $m' \subseteq m$ " implies that m' is a specialization of m'', but reverse implication does not hold true.

(P7) : Insensitivity to refinement. (a conflict should not be changed if frame of discernment is refined)

A1 corresponds to axioms MA1 and MA4 and it is consistent with properties P3, P5, P6. A2 corresponds to MA3 and to property P4. A3 corresponds to axiom MA2, this is not assumed by D & B, on the other hand it inconsistent with strong property P3. A4 follows rather strong MA5; A4 corresponds to P6.

## 4 Former Approaches to Conflict between BFs

To compare the new consonant approach to conflict, let us briefly introduce the former approaches.

## 4.1 Three Approaches from IPMU 2010

Unfortunately, there are not yet any precise formulas<sup>6</sup>, but only bounding inequalities for *combinational conflicts*:  $\frac{1}{2}TotC(m,m) \leq IntC(m) \leq TotC(m,m)$ ,  $TotC(m_1,m_2) - (IntC(m_1)+IntC(m_2)) \leq C(m_1,m_2) \leq TotC(m_1,m_2)$ .

Internal plausibility conflict of BF Bel is defined as Pl-Int $C(Bel) = 1 - \max_{\omega \in \Omega} Pl(\{\omega\})$ , where Pl is the plausibility equivalent to Bel.

 $\begin{array}{l} Plausibility \ conflict \ between \ BFs \ Bel_1, \ Bel_2 \ \text{is defined by the formula} \ Pl-C(Bel_1, Bel_2) = min(\sum_{\omega \in \Omega_{PlC}(Bel_1, Bel_2)} \frac{1}{2} |PlP(Bel_1) - PlP(Bel_2)(\omega)|, (m_1 \odot m_2)(\emptyset)), \text{where} \\ \Omega_{PlC}(Bel_1, Bel_2) \ \text{is the set of elements} \ \omega \in \Omega \ \text{with conflicting} \ Pl_P \ \text{masses} \ [11, 14]. \end{array}$ 

The idea of comparative conflictness/non-conflictness is a specification of bbms to smaller focal elements such that fit to focal elements of the other BF as much as possible. The comparative conflict between BFs  $Bel_1$  and  $Bel_2$  is defined as the least difference of such more specified bbms derived from the input  $m_1$  and  $m_2$ .

#### 4.2 Liu's Degree of Conflict and Pignistic Conflict

The above 3 approaches were compared with Liu's degree of conflict cf in [11]; cf is defined as  $cf(m_i, m_j) = (m_{\oplus}(\emptyset), difBetP_{m_i}^{m_j})$  in [22], where  $m_{\oplus}(\emptyset)$  should be rather  $m_{\odot}(\emptyset)$  (more precisely  $(m_i \odot m_j)(\emptyset)$ ) in fact,  $difBetP_{m_i}^{m_j}$  is defined as  $difBetP_{m_i}^{m_j} = max_{A\subseteq\Omega}(|BetP_{m_i}(A) - BetP_{m_j}(A)|)$ . It holds:  $difBetP_{m_i}^{m_j} = Diff(BetP_{m_i}, BetP_{m_j}) = \frac{1}{2} \sum_{\omega \in \Omega} |BetP_{m_i}(\{\omega\}) - BetP_{m_j}(\{\omega\})|$  [13].

*Pignistic conflict* is an alternative of the plausibility conflict [14], where pignistic probability BetP is used instead of normalised plausibility of singletons.

## 4.3 Conflict Based on Non-Conflicting Parts

For the recent measure of conflict ncp-Conf [15] is based on Daniel's ideas from [11] and namely from [12]. When analysing properties of approaches from [11] using

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup>Let us recall that notion 'total conflict' TotC is used for global conjunctive conflict GlcC [11].

Hájek-Valdés algebraic approach [19, 20], hypothesis<sup>7</sup> of decomposition of a BF into its conflicting and non-conflicting parts was formulated in [12]; and existence of unique non-conflicting part  $Bel_0$  of any BF Bel was proven there:

**Theorem 1.** Let  $h(Bel) = Bel \oplus U_n$ , where  $U_n$  is the uniform distribution on sigletons, i.e.,  $U_n(\{\omega_i\}) = \frac{1}{n}$ . For any BF Bel defined on  $\Omega_n$  there exists unique consonant BF Bel<sub>0</sub> such that,  $h(Bel_0 \oplus Bel_S) = h(Bel)$  for any BF Bel<sub>S</sub> such that  $Bel_S \oplus U_n = U_n$ .

**Definition 1.** Let Bel', Bel'' be two belief functions on n-element frame of discernment  $\Omega_n = \{\omega_1, \omega_2, ..., \omega_n\}$ . Let Bel'<sub>0</sub> and Bel''<sub>0</sub> be their non-conflicting parts and  $m'_0, m''_0$  the related bbas. We define conflict between BFs Bel' and Bel'' as  $ncp-Conf(Bel', Bel'') = m_{Bel'_0} \bigoplus_{0 \in Bel'_0} (\emptyset) = (m'_0 \bigoplus_{0 \in M'_0})(\emptyset)$ . Where  $\bigoplus$  is non-normalised Dempster's (conjunctive) rule of BFs combination.

For algorithm of computation of ncp-Conf(Bel', Bel'') see [15].

## 5 Consonant Conflicts between BFs

Probabilistic approximations of belief functions were used in several previous approaches, e.g. pignistic probability in Liu's degree of conflict cf and in pignistic conflict BetP-C, and normalized plausibility of singletons in plausibility conflict PLP-C.

Making a probabilistic approximation has two disadvantages in general: the approximation adds some additional information and internal conflict of a BF is increased. As we do not know how internal conflicts of individual BFs participates in global conflict of these BFs, a probabilistic approximation brings also an unspecified contribution to the conflict "between" which is defined using the transformation.

Our present idea is to use consonant approximations cAppox(Bel) instead of the probabilistic ones. Theoretically, we can use any consonant approximation such that the original BF is its specialization. We use more strict condition: inverse probabilistic transformations, i.e., such that Transf(Bel) = Transf(cAppox(Bel)), specially for pignistic transformation BetT(Bel) = BetP and plausibility (i.e. contour) transform PlT(Bel) = PlP. Thus for BetT(Bel) = BetP we will use consonant pignistic inverse  $iBetT(Bel) = _{iBet} Bel = iBet$ , given by  $_{iBet}m$ , i.e., consonant inverse of BetP: BetT(iBetT(Bel)) = BetT(Bel) = BetP and consonant inverse contour iC, i.e., consonant inverse of PlP: PlT(iCT(Bel)) =PlT(iPlT(Bel)) = PlT(Bel) = PlP, see Figure 4.

These approximations have several advantages: they have no internal conflict the entire conflict is the conflict "in between". No additional information nor internal conflict is added; internally conflicting information is removed. Analogously

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>7</sup>This hypothesis have been proven only on BFs on  $\Omega_2$  in [12]. In general case, the conflicting part seems to be in a close relationship to internal conflict of the BF.

to the original probabilistic approximations these are also uniquely defined and probabilistic approximation is preserved.

Having consonant approximations of two belief functions, we define a conflict between them. As the internal conflict of consonant approximations is zero, the entire conflict of these approximations is the conflict "in between". Let us adopt the simplest sum of multiples of disjoint focal elements:

**Definition 2.** Let  $Bel_1$ ,  $Bel_2$  be two belief functions on  $\Omega$ ,  ${}_{iC}Bel_i = iCT(Bel_i)$ and  $_{iBet}Bel_i = iBetT(Bel_i)$  be their consonant inverse contour and consonant inverse pignistic approximations given by consonant bbas  ${}_{iC}m_i$ ,  ${}_{iBet}m_i$ . Inverse contour conflict is defined by formula

$$iC\text{-}Conf(Bel_1, Bel_2) = \sum_{\substack{X \cap Y = \emptyset \\ Y \in \mathcal{F}}} iCm_1(X)iCm_2(Y),$$

where  $X, Y \subseteq \Omega$  (i.e., where  $X \in \mathcal{F}_{iCm_1}, Y \in \mathcal{F}_{iCm_2}$ ). Inverse pignistic conflict is analogously defined by

$$iBet-Conf(Bel_1, Bel_2) = \sum_{X \cap Y = \emptyset} iBet m_1(X)_{iBet} m_2(Y),$$

where  $X, Y \subseteq \Omega$  (i.e., where  $X \in \mathcal{F}_{iBetm_1}, Y \in \mathcal{F}_{iBetm_2}$ ).



Figure 4: Consonant Approximations on  $\Omega_2$ 

Figure 5: Simplices of mutually non-conflicting Belief functions on  $\Omega_2$ .

Figure 6: Simplex of quasi Bayesian BFs nonconflicting with (1, 0, 0).

#### **Basic Properties of** *iC-Conf* and *iBet-Conf* 5.1

We may easily verify that Definition 2 satisfy assumptions A1 – A4.

- **Lemma 1.** The following is equivalent: (i) iC-Conf $(Bel_1, Bel_2) = 0$
- (*ii*)  $\bigcap_{X \in \mathcal{F}_{iC}m_i} X \neq \emptyset$ (*iii*)  $X_0 \cap Y_0 \neq \emptyset$  where  $X_0 \in \mathcal{F}_{iCm_1}, Y_0 \in \mathcal{F}_{iCm_2}$  and
- $\begin{array}{l} X_0 \subset X, \ Y_0 \subset Y \ for \ any \ X \in \mathcal{F}_{iCm_1}, Y \in \mathcal{F}_{iCm_2} \\ (iv) \ \{\omega_M | Pl P_1(\omega_M) \ge Pl P_1(\omega), \omega \in \Omega\} \cap \{\omega_M | Pl P_1(\omega_M) \ge Pl P_2(\omega), \omega \in \Omega\} \neq \emptyset \end{array}$
- (v)  $\{\omega_M | Pl_1(\omega_M) \ge Pl_1(\omega), \omega \in \Omega\} \cap \{\omega_M | Pl_1(\omega_M) \ge Pl_2(\omega), \omega \in \Omega\} \neq \emptyset.$

**Lemma 2.** The following is equivalent: (i) iBet-Conf $(Bel_1, Bel_2) = 0$ 

- $\begin{array}{l} (ii) \quad \bigcap_{X \in \mathcal{F}_{iBet}m_i} X \neq \emptyset \\ (iii) \quad X_0 \cap Y_0 \neq \emptyset \text{ where } X_0 \in \mathcal{F}_{iBetm_1}, \ Y_0 \in \mathcal{F}_{iBetm_2} \text{ and} \\ X_0 \subset X, \ Y_0 \subset Y \text{ for any } X \in \mathcal{F}_{iBetm_1}, Y \in \mathcal{F}_{iBetm_2} \\ (iv) \quad \{\omega_M | BetP_1(\omega_M) \ge BetP_1(\omega), \omega \in \Omega\} \ \cap \ \{\omega_M | BetP_1(\omega_M) \ge BetP_2(\omega), \omega \in \Omega\} \neq \emptyset. \end{array}$

**Lemma 3.** For any pair of BFs on  $\Omega_2$  and, generally, for any pair of qBBFs  $Bel_1$  $Bel_2$  on  $\Omega_n$  it holds that

(i) iC- $Conf(Bel_1, Bel_2) = 0$  iff iBet- $Conf(Bel_1, Bel_2) = 0$  iff

 $\{\omega \mid m_1(\{\omega\}) = max_i\{m_1(\{\omega_i\})\}\} \cap \{\omega \mid m_2(\{\omega\}) = max_i\{m_2(\{\omega_i\})\}\} \neq \emptyset,$ 

*i.e.*, if  $(a_1 - b_1)(a_2 - b_2) \ge 0$  in the case of  $Bel_i = (a_i, b_i)$  on  $\Omega_2$ ;

(*ii*) iC- $Conf(Bel_1, Bel_2) \ge iBet$ - $Conf(Bel_1, Bel_2)$ .

From the last condition of Lemma 3 (i) it follows that the following holds in our graphical presentation: any two BFs on  $\Omega_2$  from right hand half of the triangle are mutually non-conflicting (there is no conflict between them, see the green part of the triangle on Figure 5; analogously for any BFs from left hand white part.

Analogously, it holds for qBBFs on  $\Omega_n$ : any two qBBFs from an *n*-dimensional subsimplex (1/n of the entire simplex of qBBFs, which is defined by <math>(0, 0, 0, ..., 0), and corresponding segment of BBFs where  $m(\{\omega^*\}) \ge m(\{\omega\})$  for a given  $\omega^* \in \Omega_n$ i.e., 1/n of (n-1)-dimensional subsimplex of BBFs including  $m_{\{\omega^*\}}: m_{\{\omega^*\}}(\{\omega^*\}) = 0$ 1) are mutually non-conflicting. E.g. on  $\Omega_3$  and  $m_{\{\omega_1\}}(\{\omega_1\}) = 1$  and segment of BBFs given by  $(1,0,0), (\frac{1}{2},\frac{1}{2},0), (\frac{1}{2},0,\frac{1}{2})$ , and  $(\frac{1}{3},\frac{1}{3},\frac{1}{3})$ , see green subsimplex on Figure 6. Any BF from green subsimplex is conflicting with any BFs from the white part (the rest) of the simplex, i.e. there is some positive conflict between them. For categorical qBBF (1,0,0), the maximal value 1 of conflict appears with any BF from red line between (0,0,1) and (0,1,0). The green subsimplex of mutually non-conflicting BFs is one of maximal consistent simplices discussed in [6].

**Corollary 1.** Any symmetric qBBF Bel<sub>S</sub> on  $\Omega_n$  is non-conflicting with any other  $qBBF Bel, i.e., iC-Conf(Bel_S, Bel) = 0 = iBet-Conf(Bel_S, Bel).$ 

The situation is significantly more complicated on a  $2^{(n-2)}$ -dimensional simplex of general BFs on  $\Omega_n$ . There is multidimensional structure of BFs instead of 1-dimensional h-line (a straight line<sup>8</sup> connecting a BF and related PlP); i.e., multidimensional structure of BFs with the same PlP. Analogously there is a multidimensional structure of BFs with the same BetP instead of simple 1dimensional perpendicular in the case of qBBFs. A simplex of BFs non-conflicting with (1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0) analogous to that of Figure 6 is 6-dimensional for general BFs on  $\Omega_3$ . Thus we have no simple generalization of Lemma 3 to general BFs. On the other hand we can generalize its Corollary to Lemma 4.

*Example* 1. Let  $m_1 = (1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0)$ ; for  $m_2 = (\frac{1}{3}, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, \frac{2}{3})$  we obtain  $BetP_2 =$  $(\frac{1}{3}, \frac{1}{3}, \frac{1}{3}, 0, 0, 0) = U_3, \ _{iBet}m_2 = (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0) = 0$  thus it is *iBet*-non-conflicting

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup>Its name comes from homomorhism h of algebraic structure of BFs, which is defined by  $h(Bel) = Bel \oplus U_n$ , see [8, 20].

with  $m_1$ ; whereas  $PLP_2 = (\frac{1}{5}, \frac{2}{5}, \frac{2}{5}, 0, 0, 0), {}_{iC}m_2 = (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, \frac{2}{3}),$  there is iC-Conf  $(m_1, m_2) = \frac{2}{3} > 0 = iBet$ -Conf $(m_1, m_2)$ . On the other hand, for  $m_3 = (0, 0, \frac{1}{2}, \frac{1}{2}, 0, 0)$  we obtain  $PLP_3 = U_3$  thus  ${}_{iC}m_2 = 0$ , whereas  $BetP_3 = (\frac{1}{4}, \frac{1}{4}, \frac{1}{2}, 0, 0, 0),$  and  ${}_{iBet}m_3 = (0, 0, \frac{1}{4}, 0, 0, 0),$  hence iC-Conf $(m_1, m_3) = 0 < \frac{1}{4} = iBet$ -Conf $(m_1, m_3).$ 

**Lemma 4.** (i) Any general symmetric BF Bel<sub>S</sub> on  $\Omega_n$  is non-conflicting with any other BF Bel, i.e., iC-Conf(Bel<sub>S</sub>, Bel) = 0 = iBet-Conf(Bel<sub>S</sub>, Bel).

(ii) Any BF  $Bel_{UPl}$  such that its  $PLP_{UPl} = U_n$  is *iC*-non-conflicting with any BF Bel on  $\Omega_n$ , *i.e.*, for any Bel and any  $Bel_{UPl}$  with uniform plausibility it holds that *iC*-Conf $(Bel_{UPl}, Bel) = 0$ .

(iii) Any BF  $Bel_{UBet}$  such that its  $BetP_{UBet} = U_n$  is iBet-non-conflicting with any BF Bel on  $\Omega_n$ , i.e., for any Bel and any  $Bel_{UBet}$  with uniform BetP holds  $iBet-Conf(Bel_{UBet}, Bel) = 0.$ 

**Lemma 5.** For any BF Bel on  $\Omega_n$ , its core  $C_m$ , cores  $C_{PLP}$ ,  $C_{BetP}$  of related probabilities and cores  $C_{iCm}$ ,  $C_{iBetPm}$  of their consonant approximations hold that  $C_m = C_{PLP} = C_{iCm} = C_{BetP} = C_{iBetm}$ .

**Lemma 6.** For any pair of BFs  $Bel_1$ ,  $Bel_2$  on  $\Omega_n$  and their cores  $C_{m_1}$ ,  $C_{m_2}$  it holds that (i) iC- $Conf(Bel_1, Bel_2) = 1$  iff  $C_{m_1} \cap C_{m_2} = \emptyset$ , (ii) iBet- $Conf(Bel_1, Bel_2) = 1$  iff  $C_{m_1} \cap C_{m_2} = \emptyset$ .

## 5.2 An Equivalence of Consonant *iC-Conf* to Conflict between BFs Based on their Non-Conflicting Parts *ncp-Conf*

**Lemma 7.** Consonant inverse contour conflict iC-Conf is equivalent to conflict between belief functions based on their non-conflicting parts Conf, i.e., for any pair of BFs Bel', Bel'' on  $\Omega_n$  it holds that iC-Conf(Bel', Bel'') = ncp-Conf(Bel', Bel'').





Figure 7: Inverse contour conflict between fixed BF (u, v) and general BF (a, b) on  $\Omega_2$ ; iC-Conf((u, v), (a, b)) decreases in direction of arrows and it is constant along lines without arrows.

Figure 8: Inverse pignistic conflict between fixed BF (u, v) and general BF (a, b) on  $\Omega_2$ ; *iBet-Conf*((u, v), (a, b))decreases in direction of arrows and it is constant along lines without arrows.

Unfortunately, we have found general counterexamples against Theorem 2 from [15], thus the following holds only for qBBFs, it does not hold in general.

**Theorem 2.** (i) Let  $Bel_1$  and  $Bel_2$  be arbitrary quasi Bayesian BFs on general finite frame of discernment  $\Omega_n$  given by bbas m' and m''. For both conflicts iC-Conf and iBet-Conf between  $Bel_1$  and  $Bel_2$  it holds that

$$Conf(Bel_1, Bel_2) \le \sum_{X \cap Y = \emptyset} m_1(X)m_2(Y).$$

(ii) Equality  $Conf(Bel_1, Bel_2) = \sum_{X \cap Y = \emptyset} m_1(X)m_2(Y)$  holds iff both BFs  $Bel_1$  and  $Bel_2$  are consonant.

This statement does not hold for general BFs. see Example 2 [17].

Example 2. (Counter-example against Theorem 2 from Belief'14 [15] on  $\Omega_3$ ) Let us suppose  $\Omega_3$ ,  $m_1(\{\omega_1, \omega_2\}) = 0.7$ ,  $m_1(\{\omega_1, \omega_3\}) = 0.3$ , and  $m_2(\{\omega_2, \omega_3\}) = 1.0$ . There is  $Pl_1 = (1.0, 0.7, 0.3, ...), iC_1 = (0.3, 0, 0, 0.4, 0, 0), Pl_2 = (0, 1.0, 1.0, ...),$  $iC_2 = (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1.0)$ , thus iC- $Conf(m_1, m_2) = 0.3 \cdot 1.0 = 0.3$ ; analogously  $BetP_1 = (0.5, 0.35, 0.15), iBet_1 = (0.15, 0, 0, 0.4, 0, 0), BetP_2 = (0, 0.5, 0.5), iBet_2 = (0, 0, 0, 0.5), iBet_2 = (0, 0, 0, 0, 0.5), iBet_2 = (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0), iBet_2 = (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0), iBet_2 = (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0), iBet_2 = (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0), iBet_2 = (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0), iBet_2 = (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0), iBet_2 = (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0), iBet_2 = (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0), iBet_2 = (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0), iBet_2 = (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,$ (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1.0), thus  $iBet-Conf(m_1, m_2) = 0.15$ . Nevertheless  $\sum_{X \cap Y = \emptyset} m_1(X) m_2(Y) = 0 < 0.15 = iBet-Conf(m_1, m_2) < 0.30 = 0.15$ 

iC- $Conf(m_1, m_2)$ .

#### 5.3**Relationships to Axiomatic Approaches**

We have already seen that Martins axioms MA1 – MA4 are satisfied, due to their correspondence with our satisfied assumptions A1 - A3. MA5 is not satisfied as it is too strong due to Martin's strong definition of bba inclusion, nevertheless our assumption A4 is a consequence of MA5. Martin explicitly does not assume triangle inequality Conf(Bel', Bel''') < Conf(Bel', Bel'') + Conf(Bel'', Bel'''). Both consonant conflicts are the cases, where triangle inequality does not hold true, see Ex. 3.

P3: We have equivalence only for maximal value; the strongest minimal value condition (i) implies (consonant) non-conflictness in general, medium condition (ii) does it only for quasi Bayesian BFs, and the weakest condition (iii) does not imply non-conflictness at all; either one of reverse implications does not hold true (either for qBBFs). We have validity of P4 and and P6, see our assumptions A2 and A4 above. P5 does not hold either for one of consonant conflicts as specialization of bbms can change order of plausibility and BetP values, thus also focal elements of consonant approximations. P7 is most interesting of the properties, it distinguishes consonant conflicts: it holds for iC-Conf whereas does not hold for iBet-Conf, due to that plausibility and iC approximations are consistent with refinement of the frame of discernment, but BetP and iBet do not.

**Theorem 3.** Let  $Bel_1$ ,  $Bel_2$  be any BFs given by  $m_1, m_2$  on general  $\Omega_n$ . For both consonant conflicts iC-Conf and iBet-Conf between  $Bel_1$  and  $Bel_2$  it holds that (i) if  $\bigcap_{X \in \mathcal{F}_1 \cup \mathcal{F}_2} = \emptyset$  then  $Conf(Bel_1, Bel_2) = 0$ , (ii) if both  $Bel_1$  and  $Bel_2$  are quasi Bayesian and  $\sum_{X \cap Y = \emptyset} m_1(X)m_2(Y) = 0$  then  $Conf(Bel_1, Bel_2) = 0$ , (iii)  $Conf(Bel_1, Bel_2) = 0$ ,

(*iii*)  $Conf(Bel_1, Bel_2) = 1$  iff  $C_1 \cap C_2 = \emptyset$ .

#### 5.4 A Comparison with Previous Approaches to Conflict

#### 5.4.1 Combinational Conflict

We suppose  $TotC(m_1, m_2) - (IntC(m_1) + IntC(m_2)) \leq C(m_1, m_2) \leq TotC(m_1, m_2)$ for combinational conflict. On the other hand,  $0 \leq Conf(Bel_1, Bel_2) \not\leq \sum_{X \cap Y = \emptyset} m_1(X)m_2(Y) = TotC(Bel_1, Bel_2)$  for both *iC-Conf* and *iBet-Conf*.

 $\sum_{X \cap Y = \emptyset} m_1(X) m_2(Y) = T ore(Ber_1, Ber_2)$  for both *ic-conf* and *iBer-conf*. Thus both the consonant conflicts are not compatible with the formulation of combinational conflict [11].

#### 5.4.2 Plausibility Conflict *Pl-C*

More interesting is a comparison with the most elaborated and precisely defined plausibility conflict. We can observe that: (Conf stands for iC-Conf or iBet-Conf)

**Lemma 8.** For any couple of belief functions (a, b), (c, d) on 2-element frame of discernment it holds that: (i) Conf((a, b), (c, d)) = 0 iff Pl-C((a, b), (c, d)) = 0, (ii)  $Conf((a, b), (c, d)) \leq Pl-C((a, b), (c, d))$ .

For any couple of belief functions Bel', Bel'' on general finite frame of discernment  $\Omega_n$  it holds that: (iii) iC-Conf(Bel',Bel'')=0 iff Pl-C<sub>sm</sub>(Bel',Bel'')=0.

(iv) If  $Pl-C_0(Bel', Bel'') = 0$  then also iC-Conf(Bel', Bel'') = 0 (in general; but not for final Pl-C(Bel', Bel'')).

(v), (vi) For qBBFs (iii) + (iv) hold also for iBet-Conf.

Thus, the nature of Conf((a, b), (c, d)) is very close to that of Pl-C((a, b), (c, d)). Conf((a, b), (c, d)) is simpler as its conflictness/non-conflictness simply comes from  $\sum_{X \cap Y=\emptyset} iCm_1(X)_{iC}m_2(Y) = \frac{|a-b|}{1-min(a,b)} \cdot \frac{|d-c|}{1-min(c,d)}, \sum_{X \cap Y=\emptyset} iBetm_1(X)_{iBet}m_2(Y) = |a-b| \cdot |d-c|$ . Hence there is no necessity to check conflictness of all focal elements. For the same nature see also Figures 7 and 8 which fit also to Pl-C and Bet-C, respectively.

#### 5.4.3 Comparative Conflict cp-C

Comparative conflict has a completely different nature. There are mutually comparatively conflicting couples of BFs with same max Pl or max BetP elements of  $\Omega_n$ . Thus they are non-conflicting according to Conf, (e.g., Bel' = (0.5, 0.3, 0, 0, 0, 0.1), Bel'' = (0.7, 0, 0, 0, 0.1, 0.1).) On the other hand, there are comparatively nonconflicting BFs, which prefer different  $\omega_i$ 's - they are conflicting according to Conf (e.g. Bel' = (0.4, 0.2, 0.1, 0.1, 0, 0), Bel'' = (0.3, 0.4, 0.1, 0.1, 0, 0)). cp-C has some relationship to property P5, which should be investigated in future.

#### 5.4.4 Liu's Measure of Conflict cf

Any couple of BFs that is mutually non-conflicting according to cf (Section 4.2) is (under some conditions) also mutually non-conflicting according to consonant conflicts (the reverse does not hold true); and *Conf* is less or equal to cf. For behaviour of values of both the components of  $cf = (m_{\bigcirc}(\emptyset), difBetP)$  of a fixed (u, v) with a general (a, b) on  $\Omega_2$  see Figures 9, 10; values of both the components decrease in direction of arrows, they are constant along lines without arrow.



Figure 9:  $m_{\bigcirc}(\emptyset)$  component of cf between fixed (u, v) and general (a, b).

Figure 10: difBetP between fixed BF (u, v) and general BF (a, b) on  $\Omega_2$ .

**Lemma 9.** (i) For any couple of belief functions Bel', Bel'' on n-element frame of discernment it holds that, if  $cf(Bel', Bel'') = ((m' \odot m'')(\emptyset), difBet_{Bel'}^{Bel''}) = (0, 0)$  then also iBet-Conf(Bel', Bel'') = 0,

(ii) The above holds also for any pair of qBBFs Bel', Bel'' and iC-Conf(Bel', Bel'') (iii) For Bel' = (a,b), Bel'' = (c,d) on  $\Omega_2$  holds further: Conf((a,b), (c,d))  $\leq cf((a,b), (c,d));$  or precisely Conf  $\leq ((a,b) \odot (c,d))(\emptyset)$  & Conf  $\leq difBet_{(a,b)}^{(c,d)}$ .

## 6 Conclusion

In this study, we introduced a new approach of conflict between belief functions on general finite frame of discernment. Properties of its instances iC-Conf and iBet-Conf were analyzed and compared with former approaches. Conflict based on non-conflicting parts of BFs [15] was observed to be equivalent to consonant conflict iC-Conf. Further, satisfaction of Martin's [23] and Destercke-Burger's [18] axioms was studied.

A common elaboration of the theoretic principles of the presented results with those from [18] and [23] is a challenge for a future research. It should include an analysis of positive conflict in situations such that  $\sum_{X \cap Y = \emptyset} m_1(X)m_2(X) = 0$ .

The presented theoretical results improve general understanding of conflict between belief functions and entire nature of belief functions. Correct understanding of conflicts may, consequently, improve a combination of conflicting belief functions.

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